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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent studies have identified a gap between corporate gov-
ernance (CG) and project management. Project management
(PM) originated from system engineering and systematic opti-
mization research that focused on the trade-off between time,
cost and quality objectives; but has evolved to become substan-
tially different from operations management (Bredillet 2010).
PM concepts are increasingly used to achieve strategic objectives
in rapidly changing business environments. Some models have
been developed to link PM to corporate strategy and a common
approach is the cascade model; which decomposes control struc-
ture from mission and strategy, through program and project,
to the lowest level of activity (Youker 1993; Turner 2002). How-
ever, the challenge to ensure that projects align with business
strategy remains.
Some researchers have approached this problem from the view-
point of enterprise management. For example, by establishing
an organizational PM committee or PM office, to oversee project
activities and progress (Office of Government Commerce 2009).
However, Pinto (2014) argued that in practice, these often con-
stitute bottom-up systems of departmental or functional man-
agement and so only work well on smaller, or in-house projects
(Renz 2007). Recent studies of multinational corporation man-
agement found that headquarters often experienced problems in
controlling the activities of subsidiaries in worldwide operations
(Engwall 2001). Marnewick and Labuschagne (2011) discovered
that CG was unable to replace “project governance” (PG). There
is a growing need therefore, to facilitate interfaces between this
newer approach termed PG, and governance at corporate level.
PG therefore, encourages effective PM behavior, such that it
harmonizes with organizational values, policies and regulations
(Garland 2009; Müller 2009; Turner 2008). In our pilot study,
the Chief Director of a Highway Construction Corporate stat-
ed that their company now implements a PG mechanism on all
of its projects, to ensure that they meet both corporate strate-
gy and stakeholders’ values. The PG mechanism has therefore,
achieved a foothold among Chinese infrastructure projects, but
its key aspects and how they interact and perform are still not
fully understood.
The Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge
(PMBoK) describes PG as that which is able to supervise a
project in accordance with the organization governance model
through the whole project life cycle; providing a comprehen-
sive, consistent method of control and ensuring its success by
defining, documenting and communicating reliable, repeatable
project practices. It includes a framework for making project
decisions; defines roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities for
the success of the project; and determines the effectiveness of the
project manager (Project Management Institute 2000; Project
Management Institute 2013). PMBoK also lists 11 PG frame-
work elements, which are not systematically structured but over-
lapped. Previous research shows that PG has focused on gover-
nance structures, frameworks and models, and governance of the
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project process. It has not embraced practical tactics, which are
closely linked to performance (Lu et al. 2015). PG approaches at
operational level require further investigation and development
if a systematic framework is to be developed. Two questions
therefore underpin the present study: What are appropriate PG
approaches? And, can they be represented as a structured mod-
el?
The study explores the notions of PG and “enterprise manage-
ment” (i.e. “internal control”) and how combined, they can en-
sure viable organizational PG. In contrast to Lu et al. (2015)’s
work, this research starts from PG’s direct and control func-
tions. Taking account of this, the study proposes a concep-
tual PG framework that embraces four key elements; based
on the premise that without effective organizational governance
and management systems support, PG and management cannot
operate effectively. A questionnaire survey determines project
managers’ levels of agreement on PG measures. Data were sub-
sequently analyzed using mean values and exploratory factor
analysis, before using confirmatory factor analysis to validate
the model. Practical recommendations and suggestions for fur-
ther research conclude the study.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW OF PG
APPROACHES AND THEIR
CONSTITUENTS
2.1 Project Governance
Current PM management systems, do not always promote
project value achievement. The most important reason is that
they focus on the project implementation process, without
macroscopic and overall thinking (Andersen 2016). The project
team need direction from upper levels of an organization, and
this is particularly important for a cross-organizational project.
Therefore, PG has aroused the attention of researchers, and be-
come a frontier topic in PM research fields (Bredillet 2010).
There is consensus among the literature that PG developed
from CG. The Association of Project Management considers
PG to comprise corporate governance activities associated with
projects (Association for Project Management 2012) and in this
regard, CG is described as the institution dealing with principal-
agent problems between shareholders and managers (Williamson
and Ouchi 1981). However, PG is more complicated than this
and so its definition displays inconsistency. One possible rea-
son is its multiple levels of governance which including program,
portfolio and individual projects, as well as numerous project
stakeholders. However, if PG is traced up the project organiza-
tion structure, it represents a vertical governance structure from
project based organization (PBO) between the project manager
and their team (Williamson and Ouchi 1981).
Organizational governance provides a framework for ethical
decision-making and managerial action based on transparency,
accountability, and defined roles (Müller 2009). PG hence pro-
vides structure - through which the project objectives of the
project are set; the means of attaining these objectives are deter-
mined; and performance is governed (Turner 2006). Klakegg
et al. (2008) suggested that a governance framework includes
process, procurement model, decision-making, review techni-
ques, and objectives. Too and Weaver (2014) contended that PG
is the “management of project management” so it is necessary to
investigate its operational level approaches to better understand
its working mechanism.
2.2 Project Governance Approaches
Research has previously considered detailed measures of PM,
such as governance approaches or measures (Ruuska et al. 2011).
These were described as “governmentality” in Müller and Lecoeu-
vre (2014) and are taken to embrace a wide range of control
techniques that apply to a wide variety of objects. PG has also
been expressed as elements or factors in a variety of literature
but a definitive, comprehensive list of these is difficult to find.
Müller and Lecoeuvre (2014) proffered 10 measures grouped
under outcome control or behavior control; while Lu et al.
(2015) divided PG into contractual and relational governance
elements. Abednego and Ogunlana (2006) studied Indonesian
PPP projects to propose eight factors, being: 1. making the
right decisions at the right time (a form of active participation);
2. contract fairness; 3. information transparency; 4. responsive
and timely decisional actions; 5. continuous control and moni-
toring to achieve common goals and satisfy all interests; 6. equa-
lity between all parties; 7. effectiveness and efficiency; and 8. ac-
countability. Renz (2007) used key responsibility to describe PG.
Hung (1998)’s work in identifying governance as linking, coordi-
nating, control, strategy, maintenance and support, Renz (2007)
developed six key responsibilities that integrate with each other:
1. system management (a societal embedding role); 2. mission
management (strategic direction, support and control); 3. in-
tegrity management (normative support in downside issues); 4.
extended stakeholder management (linking, coordination, con-
trol); 5. risk management; and 6. audit management.
Klakegg et al. (2008) investigated how the interface between
governance and PM works for public projects through three case
studies - whose detailed governance elements addressed the de-
velopment of cost and time estimates. Their research also con-
sidered governance principles concerning cost estimation/control
and systematic analysis of the effect of these principles. Gov-
ernance principles of public projects were described as: estab-
lishing a common worldview and stabilizing rules of conduct;
differentiation between projects based on complexity (etc.); and
mechanisms to reduce complexity, distribute risk, and trigger
governance processes in response to environmental turbulence
(Klakegg et al. 2008). Ruuska et al. (2011) claimed there are
several elements that shape the governance of a large project, in-
cluding: contract structure; procurement organization; supplier
management; risk sharing; project monitoring and coordination;
external collaboration; and communication between project ac-
tors. Ten PG sub-dimensions evolved from Müller and Lecoeu-
vre (2014) that were empirically tested. These are: 1. decision-
making; 2. remuneration; 3. legitimacy; 4. financial objectives;
5. long-term objectives for shareholder-stakeholder dimensions;
6. rule orientation; 7. level of control; 8. adherence to job de-
scriptions; 9. role of support institutions; and 10. compliance
expectations for behavior-outcome control dimensions.
Two principal schools of thought regarding governance were i-
dentified by Too and Weaver (2014). The first is that governance
is a function of management or any entity responsible for making
decisions and/or overseeing (controlling) the work of the organi-
zation or its projects. The second regards PG as a single process
with different facets; whose functions of governance concern re-
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lationships; change; the organization’s people; financial aspects;
and viability/sustainability. Lu et al. (2015) categorized PG in-
to contractual and relational governance, where the former com-
prises fundamental elements, change elements and governance
elements. Relational governance is represented by trust and re-
lational norms that involve information exchange, solidarity and
flexibility. These categories are similar to the concepts of “hard”
and “soft” governance espoused by Walker et al. (2007). Hard
governance refers to the specific rules, regulations and codes of
conduct underpinning the project implementation process, and
defines each stakeholders’ responsibility/authority in the pro-
cess of achieving goals. Soft governance concerns the mutual
exchange mode between the two sides within a governance struc-
ture and project regulation of the governance body. The most
important aspect of soft governance is a trade-off between trust
and control (ibid.). Zwikael and Smyrk (2015) further enriched
the theoretical mechanism of control-trust of project governance;
suggesting that PG tends toward the external PBO environment
and that it is important for PG to establish the accountability
and specific duties of stakeholders clearly.
Overall, a project manager needs support that transcends ex-
ecutive level help - a working mechanism between CG and PM -
confirming a need for PG in the form of a “process-oriented sys-
temąŋ strategically directed, synthetically managed and holisti-
cally controlled, in an entrepreneurial and ethical way, appropri-
ate to the singular, time limited, interdisciplinary and complex
context of projects” (Renz 2007). Renz’s six-system model e-
choes the essence of governance: setting direction and exercising
control. Too and Weaver (2014) for instance, conceptualized
PG as a set of nested governance and management functions.
In most organizations, a steering group is the principal PG in-
stitution whose tasks include establishing the governance infras-
tructure; setting project goals; providing the means to achieve
project goals; and controlling progress (Müller 2009). PG there-
fore, provides a comprehensive, consistent control/ motivational
framework to ensure that project development aligns with orga-
nizational expectation.
This study adopted Too and Weaver (2014)’s suggestion that
there are two functions for a PG system. The first concerns deci-
sions regarding which projects the organization should approve,
fund and support; and the second concerns oversight and assur-
ance. This study concentrates on the latter function, to focus on
PG approaches based on Biesenthal and Wilden (2014)’s theo-
ry of governance being a multi-level phenomenon. The research
constructs these approaches hierarchically.
3 RESEARCH METHOD AND
RESPONDENTS’ DEMOGRAPHY
Prior to conducting a questionnaire survey for this study, a con-
sultation exercise with three industry professionals determined
their agreement on PG control subsystems and concomitant
measures. The first participant was Board Director of a property
operation company; the second was Director of Research and De-
velopment (R&D) within a production company; and the third
was a project manager for a state-owned land development com-
pany. Based on the leading question of “How do you govern (or
are you governing) your projects?” Thirty diversified answers
were analyzed to conclude with 21 PG measures as shown in
Table 1.
Questions on how project managers are under PG direction
and control were consolidated into a questionnaire. The ques-
tionnaire was distributed at the seventh China PM Application
and Practice Forum, held in Beijing. All questionnaire respon-
Table 1. PG control subsystems and concomitant approaches
Code Statement of governance approach
Belief 1 Project selection is based on clearly defined strategic goals and creeds
Belief 2 In the process of PM, the company regards the behavioral norms of correct fundamental values
Belief 3 The company demands project members to behave in line with company ‘norms’
Belief 4 The company encourages project managers to develop autonomy within the scope of the company’s au-
thority and rules
Belief 5 After top management has defined the project, it can only be modified with feedback
Norm 1 The company has an explicit regulatory framework and regulations on expected standards of behavior
Norm 2 The company sets clear spans of PM responsibility and ranges of authority
Norm 3 The company continually inspects and supervises project implementation and management
Norm 4 There are penalties for when project implementation behavior violates relevant regulations
Norm 5 In project process management, key performance indicators monitor and control project milestones
Norm 6 The company has explicit maximum limits of possible deviation in the process of PM
Norm 7 The company has specified a clear change process
Norm 8 Project outcomes and standards will remain unequivocal and unchangeable after project commences
Norm 9 The company sets up dedicated communication systems for exchanging project’s internal and external
information
Incentive 1 The company has incentives to encourage project members to strictly follow basic values as their beliefs
Incentive 2 The company has internal sanctions for when PM behavior contradicts its values
Incentive 3 There are certain incentive schemes for relevant project personnel to comply with rules
Incentive 4 The company determines rewards and sanctions for project members to reflect levels of project achievement
Risk 1 The company encourages different levels of staff to highlight any uncertainty relating to the project
Risk 2 The company encourages different levels of staff to supplement added value factors to the project
Risk 3 The company has stipulated the collective participation rules of decision activity
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dents had led a project team and where possible, the principal
researcher sat with each respondent during questionnaire com-
pletion to provide support if required. Respondent project man-
agers and team leaders were asked about how they were governed
by their corporation or boss. This yielded 62 completed ques-
tionnaires. To expand the sample, a further two surveys were
conducted during an International Project Management Associ-
ation (IPMA) C level certificate assessment in August 2014; and
a PM saloon in January 2015, both in Xiamen, Southeast Chi-
na. The combined, resulting 127 completed questionnaires were
considered an adequate number for robust statistical analyses
(Hair et al. 2011).
Two respondents were unwilling to give their ages or PM ex-
perience (Table 2) but among the remainder, 45 (35.4%) were
under the age of 30; 55 (43.3%) were between the ages of 31 and
39; 21 (16.5%) were between 40 and 49; 3 (2.4%) were between
50 and 59; and 1 (0.8%) was over 60. Most respondents (32,
25.5%) held three to five years PM experience; 28 (22%) held
five to eight years; 27 (21.3%) had between eight and 15 years;
17 (13.4%) held over 15 years; and those with less than three
years comprised 21 (16.5%) of the respondent sample.
To investigate different perspectives on governance approaches
between the nature of projects, statistical analysis was conduct-
ed among different project categories viz. i) those associated
with construction engineering and infrastructure (classified as
“traditional” projects); ii) “modern” projects that included IT
development, information systems and R&D; and iii) “other”
projects which included process reengineering, marketing, man-
agerial and organizational innovations. The three sub-sample
classifications comprised equal numbers, which facilitated anal-
ysis between them.
Regarding respondents’ management level, data were skewed,
only 12 (9.4%) of were senior (i.e. above project manager); while
55 (43.3%) were project managers and the remainder most likely
team leaders (refer Table 2). This reflects hierarchical organiza-
tion structure: with fewer senior managers or high-level decision
makers. The main part of the questionnaire asked about how
“bosses” control and motivate project teams (managers) to real-
ize project goals. Questions were arranged under four topics that
reflected Simon (2004)’s subsystems (belief, boundary, diagnose
and control, diagnose and feedback). Questions were presented
as a series of Likert items (Holt 2014) inviting respondents to
choose a number from 0-5 based on their experiences where: 5
= completely agree on a statement; 4 = strongly agree; 3 = a-
gree; 2 = disagree; 1 = strongly disagree; and 0 = completely
disagree.
4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
There are three key aspects to the following data analysis: i) ex-
ploration of agreement on proposed project control approaches;
ii) grouping approaches into the smallest number of meaningful
categories based on factor analysis (to test Simon’s four sub-
systems model); and iii) reliability and validity testing of the
construct emanating from stage (ii).
4.1 Explanation of Governing Control Approaches
and Their Ranking
Mean ranking is a convenient way to compare respondents’ per-
ceived importance of variables (Pell 2005; Holt 2014). Table 3
shows the ranking results of 21 PG control approaches. The
Table 2. Respondents’ and projects’ profiles
Number of cases Percentage (%)
Ages
>60 1 0.8
50-59 3 2.4
40-49 21 16.5
30-39 55 43.3
<30 45 35.4
No mention 2 1.6
Totals 127 100
Years of PM experience
>15 17 13.4
8-15 27 21.3
5-8 28 22
3-5 32 25.2
<3 21 16.5
No mention 2 1.6
Totals 127 100
Project types
New 46 36.2
Modern 39 30.7
Traditional 42 33.1
Totals 127 100
Respondent’s position
Project team leader 57 44.9
Project manager 55 43.3
Senior member in company 12 9.4
No mention 3 2.4
Totals 127 100
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lowest value variable is “Project outcomes and standards will re-
main unequivocal and unchangeable after project commences”
(x¯ = 3.29). The narrow range among results (x¯ = 3.29 to 4.01)
suggests that all approaches were considered quite important
for PG. The highest mean value variable is “Decision-making of
project selection is based on clearly defined strategic goals and
creeds” (belief 1) which belongs to “belief system”. Two vari-
ables, “Company demands project members to behave in line
with company ‘norms’” (belief 3) and “In the process of PM, the
company regards the behavioral norms of correct fundamental
values” (belief 2) rank at second and fourth respectively. This
indicates that the best governing measure for a successful project
is to inspire principles of creed and value into project managers.
This aligns with the theory that belief systems facilitate effective
management practice (England and Lee 1974; Korukonda 1991)
at least cost (Hechter 2008).
Table 3 also shows analysis of variance results from testing
different opinions on the variables based on respondents’ pro-
fessional positions and types of project. Only a few variables
demonstrate significant (p≤0.05) differences - four by types of
projects and three by respondents’ positions. Variables exhibi-
ting different opinions based on types of project are as follows.
Belief 3: “Company demands project members to behave in
line with company ‘norms” ’, Norm 1: “Company has explicit
regulatory framework and regulations on expected standards
of behavior”, Norm 4: “There are penalties for when project
implementation behavior violates relevant regulations”, and In-
centive 4: “Company determines rewards and sanctions for
project members to reflect levels of project achievement”. All
of these achieved a higher mean value among “modern” projects,
while the lower mean values relate to “new” projects. “Mod-
ern” projects are those with clearly defined goals and a gov-
erning body with strong institutional mechanisms (Turner and
Cochrane 1993).
Three variables with significantly different means based on re-
spondents’ positions are; Belief 4: “Company encourages project
managers to develop autonomy within the scope of the compa-
ny’s authority and rules”, Risk 3: “Company has stipulated the
collective participation rules of decision activity”, and Risk 1:
“Company encourages different levels of staff to highlight any
uncertainty relating to the project”. These three variables re-
late to innovation, and suggest that incentive schemes should
encourage the creativity of project team members. Overall, re-
spondents holding senior positions offered higher mean values
than project manager/team leaders.
4.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis
To test the four piers of PG framework, an exploratory fac-
tor analysis abstracted key data components (Zhu 2011; Ver-
ma 2013). Cronbach’s alpha calculated an estimate of internal
consistency and indicated how well the items in a set correlate
with one another (Brown 2001) (the consistency metric ranges
between zero and one). In the early stages of research on predic-
tor tests or hypothesized approaches of a construct, reliability
of 0.70 or higher is satisfactory (Nunnally 1978), but for testing
purposes it needs a value > 0.90. Cronbach’s alpha was comput-
ed at 0.94, suggesting that survey data are highly interrelated,
thus the experiment is repeatable and the scale is reliable (Noru-
sis 1992). As part of the factor analysis, a correlation matrix of
the 21 variables was computed and each was found to have a cor-
relation coefficient > 0.30. This meant that there was no need
to eliminate any of them prior to principal component analysis.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic is satisfactory for factor anal-
ysisat 0.85 (Kaiser 1974). Bartlett’s test of sphericity tests the
hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix. In
Table 3. Survey results for governance control approaches
Control approaches Different types of project Different project participants
Code Means STD Rank F Sig. F Sig.
Belief 1 4.02 0.85 1 1.17 0.31 1.83 0.16
Belief 2 3.85 0.79 4 2.48 0.09 1.34 0.27
Belief 3 3.93 0.93 2 6.92 .001** 1.61 0.2
Belief 4 3.57 1 11 2.11 0.13 5.87 .004**
Belief 5 3.66 0.8 9 1.68 0.19 2.92 0.06
Incentive 1 3.37 1.1 20 0.6 0.55 0.01 0.99
Incentive 2 3.47 1.04 14 1.12 0.33 0.11 0.9
Incentive 3 3.44 1.02 17 1.18 0.31 1.51 0.23
Incentive 4 3.43 1.05 18 5.55 .005** 2.88 0.06
Norm 1 3.84 0.96 5 4.5 .013* 1.79 0.17
Norm 2 3.84 0.93 6 2.77 0.07 1.26 0.29
Norm 3 3.86 0.82 3 2.67 0.07 1.66 0.19
Norm 4 3.64 0.97 10 7.75 .001** 0.5 0.61
Norm 5 3.79 0.85 7 0.22 0.8 0.9 0.41
Norm 6 3.45 0.88 15 0.58 0.56 1.23 0.3
Norm 7 3.78 1.02 8 2.73 0.07 0.98 0.38
Norm 8 3.28 0.99 21 0.87 0.42 1 0.37
Norm 9 3.56 1.03 12 1.6 0.21 1.87 0.16
Risk 1 3.55 0.9 13 2.05 0.13 5.19 .007**
Risk 2 3.45 0.92 16 2 0.14 2.99 0.05
Risk 3 3.42 0.94 19 2.58 0.08 3.45 .035*
Note: **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05
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this case, the sphericity statistic is large (1,290.05) and its sig-
nificance level is small (p < 0.00): suggesting that the principal
component matrix is effective (Wu 2009). The next stage gener-
ated Eigen values and a component matrix. This was imperfect
because variables Norm 9: “Company sets up dedicated commu-
nication systems for exchanging project’s internal and external
information”; and Norm 8: “Project outcomes and standards will
remain unequivocal and unchangeable after project commences”,
achieved weightings < 0.50. These results suggest that they did
not belong to any extracted factors and should be removed.
Subsequent analysis therefore, considered 19 governance con-
trol approaches. The new initial and rotated matrix results are
shown in Table 4. The second, third and fourth columns of the
table are the initial matrix, and the next three columns show re-
sults of extraction based on Eigen values > 1.0, using the default
method. The factors are listed in descending order of variance
explained and > 63% of the total variance is attributable to the
first four factors - a minimum requirement for social research
(Hair et al. 2011).
The right three columns of Table 5 show rotated factor load-
ings. Notably, rotation does not affect the goodness of fit of
a factor solution (Norusis 1992); the cumulative percentage of
the six main components is equal after rotation; and the Eigen
value/percentage of variance accounting for each factor does
change. Table 5 shows the factor groupings based on varimax
rotation.
4.3 Reliability and Validity of the Model
The exploratory factor analysis produced a four-dimensional PG
control model, represented by normative management control,
belief system, incentive mechanism, and risk governance. Reli-
ability and validity analysis was conducted to test if the survey
data fit with the measurement model. Reliability concerns the
quality of measurement in terms of “consistency” or “repeatabil-
ity” - with consistency represented by Cronbach’s Alpha coeffi-
cient. Internal reliability relates to the degree of internal consis-
tency testing with the same variable; while external reliability
measures consistency between results using the same question-
naire item on the same objective at a different time (also known
as “retest reliability”). This research did not involve repeated
measurements of the same objective so external reliability was
irrelevant.
Since the questionnaire statements were developed from inter-
views, validity tested the association between theory and em-
pirical evidence. This analysis used AMOS (Wu 2009) to test
construct validity; a measure typically represented by conver-
gent, discriminant and nomological validity (Hair et al. 2011).
Convergent validity indicates high correlations between all items
measuring the same latent variables of the questionnaire us-
ing a Standard Load Factor (SLF), Average Variance Extracted
(AVE), and Composite Reliability (CR) (Wu 2009). This study
used a matrix comprising latent variables’ squared root of AVE
and the correlation coefficients between the latent variables to
test the discriminate validity. If this measure is higher than the
remaining correlation coefficients, it shows that the question-
naire has good discriminant validity (ibid.).
Results are shown in Table 6. The first column lists the four
constructs. The second lists Crobach’s Alpha coefficients, which
are all > 0.7 and therefore above the acceptable level (Hair et al.
2011). Column four shows the Corrected Item-Total Correlation
(CITC) - only six items have CITC value over 0.70. Fourteen
items have a value between 0.5 and 0.7. Where CITC value is
<0.5 it should be deleted from the final model (Hair et al. 2011).
The fifth column is the standardized factor loading (SLF), sim-
ilarly required to be > 0.7 for a good model, although < 0.5 is
unacceptable (Hair et al. 2011). The failed item is Belief 4 -
implying this is a unique component.
The sixth column shows AVE (minimum value should be >
0.5). Two principal factors (normative management control and
belief system) are below this value. In normative management
control, if the item Belief 4 is deleted, the responding AVE value
increases to 0.49, that is, close to 0.50. However, the deleting of
defective results under “belief system” is still unable to improve
its AVE over 0.5. This indicates there is some room for im-
provement in PG research. The acceptable results are construct
reliability (column seven). These are all greater than 0.7, which
indicates internal consistency in the four components, meaning
that the measures all consistently represent the same latent con-
struct (Hair et al. 2011).
Discriminant validity is tested by the matrix in columns eight
to 11. There are three factors (normative management control,
incentive mechanism and risk governance), whose root squares
of AVE are greater than the correlation coefficient between prin-
cipal factors. The belief system factor’s root square of AVE is
less than the correlation coefficient between other factors; imply-
ing that the questionnaire inaccurately measured “belief system”
and that therefore, the test statement should be revised for fu-
ture research. This might be difficult since belief is strongly
associated with value, culture, customs, and convention. These
vary among industrial and national backgrounds (England and
Lee 1974; Korukonda 1991).
5 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION
This explorative study has also derived four factors that reinforce
the pilot study results. The first factor is defined “Normative
management control”. All of its seven variables are associated
with the process or behavior of management; indicating that
PG is essentially “PM”. The second factor was defined “belief
system” following the original assumption that it refers to the
value, creed, behavior, tradition, culture (etc.) of an organiza-
tion, thereby influencing management issues in either implicit or
explicit forms. The third factor was defined “incentive mecha-
nism”, which is popular in CG and principal-agency theory. In-
centive schemes also help influence managers and encourage ef-
ficient operation. The final factor was defined “risk governance”
and broadly represented variables relating to risk/opportunity
management.
5.1 Normative Management Control (NMC)
Norms are rules that pre- and proscribe behavior in social sit-
uations (Hechter 2008). The analysis shows that “normative
management control” includes management process control and
boundary control. This result reflects the Project Management
Body of Knowledge and much other literature relating to the PG
concept. The factor accounts for 19% of the total governance
control variance and comprises: Norm 7: “Company has speci-
fied a clear change process” (Sig. = 0.82), Norm 1: “Company
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Table 4. Total variance explained
C
om
po
ne
nt Initial eigen values Extraction sums of squared loadings Rotation sums of squared loadings
Total % of Variance Cumulative% Total % of Variance
Cumulative
% Total % of Variance
Cumulative
%
1 7.63 40.15 40.15 7.63 40.15 40.15 3.58 18.82 18.82
2 1.88 9.9 50.05 1.88 9.9 50.05 3 15.76 34.58
3 1.39 7.32 57.37 1.39 7.32 57.37 2.86 15.03 49.62
4 1.15 6.06 63.43 1.15 6.06 63.43 2.62 13.81 63.43
5 0.93 4.91 68.34
6 0.88 4.66 72.99
7 0.75 3.96 76.95
8 0.64 3.38 80.34
9 0.53 2.8 83.14
10 0.48 2.54 85.68
11 0.46 2.43 88.12
12 0.44 2.3 90.42
13 0.41 2.17 92.58
14 0.36 1.87 94.46
15 0.28 1.49 95.95
16 0.24 1.26 97.21
17 0.23 1.2 98.42
18 0.17 0.87 99.28
19 0.14 0.72 100
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Norm 8 and Norm 9 were dropped for low loading.
Table 5. Rotated component matrix(a)
Component
1 2 3 4
Norm 7 0.822 0.137 -0.013 0.07
Norm 1 0.761 0.121 0.135 0.295
Norm 2 0.734 0.126 0.368 0.03
Norm 6 0.612 -0.107 0.08 0.468
Norm 3 0.606 0.422 0.342 0.001
Norm 4 0.57 0.262 0.37 0.033
Norm 5 0.558 0.437 -0.052 0.191
Belief 2 0.264 0.712 0.245 0.21
Belief 5 0.042 0.701 0.228 0.124
Belief 1 0.245 0.637 0.259 0.057
Belief 4 0.024 0.591 0.076 0.441
Belief 3 0.238 0.558 0.293 0.267
Incentive 1 0.161 0.286 0.817 0.087
Incentive 3 0.148 0.315 0.745 0.188
Incentive 2 0.06 0.24 0.639 0.23
Incentive 4 0.279 0.023 0.631 0.406
Risk 1 0.055 0.204 0.269 0.784
Risk 2 0.14 0.344 0.225 0.761
Risk 3 0.257 0.183 0.132 0.7
(a)Rotation converged in six iterations.
Extraction: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
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Table 6. Reliability and construct validity analysis for PG control dimensions
Constructs Cronbach’salpha Item CITC
Standard
loading
(SLF)
AVE CR
Normative
management
control
Belief
system
Incentive
mechanism
Risk
governance
Normative
Management
Control
0.860
Norm 7 0.674 0.713
0.473a 0.861 0.688
Norm 1 0.727 0.777
Norm 2 0.691 0.772
Norm 6 0.530 0.559
Norm 3 0.675 0.740
Norm 4 0.546 0.618
Norm 5 0.564 0.600
Belief
System 0.788
Belief 2 0.699 0.795
0.490b 0.790 0.670** 0.658c
Belief 5 0.549 0.601
Belief 1 0.538 0.606
Belief 3 0.593 0.682
Incentive 1 0.766 0.860
Incentive
Mechanism 0.816
Incentive 3 0.716 0.846
0.555 0.830 0.598** 0.732** 0.746Incentive 2 0.535 0.613Incentive 4 0.544 0.625
Risk 1 0.738 0.896
Risk
Governance 0.828
Risk 2 0.754 0.849 0.641 0.840 0.531** 0.686** 0.612** 0.800
Risk 3 0.576 0.631
a,bBelow the minimum requirement of 0.5. cSquare root of AVE smaller than the correlation coefficient. Two-tailed signifi-
cance reported for the correlationcoefficients. Square root of AVE for each latent construct is given in diagonal. p**<0.01.
has explicit regulatory framework and regulations on expected
standards of behavior” (0.76), Norm 2: “Company sets clear
span of PM responsibility and range of authority” (0.73), Norm
6: “Company has explicit maximum limits of possible deviation
in the process of PM” (0.61), Norm 3: “Company continually in-
spects and supervises project implementation and management”
(0.60), Norm 4: “There are penalties for when project implemen-
tation behavior violates relevant regulations” (0.57), and Norm
5: “In project process management, there are key performance
indicators to monitor and control project milestones” (0.55).
NMC typically takes the form of explicit rules, regulations, and
ethical codes of conduct to control employees’ behavior through-
out project life cycle. Violation of these can bring serious loss to
the company either economically or with regard to reputation.
Governance also has a directing function to keep projects viable
in the case of dilemmas. Project change often results from un-
certain environments, whose impact can be significant and affect
project operation or progress. Initial plans can be influenced by
external and internal uncertainties, calling for clear instruction
from PG. This may also require a change management frame-
work, typically informed by the governance board, because in-
consistent change process management can produce disruptive
effects (Motawa et al. 2007). Hwang and Low (2012) confirmed
that such frameworks are more prominent among larger compa-
nies, which tend to implement intensive change management.
Compared with a CG auditing system, PM prefers more “im-
mediate” measurement to monitor project progress. Earned val-
ue management is an appropriate tool in monitoring time and
cost performance but this needs timely and accurate data that
might be difficult to collect in some situations. Drucker (2009)
suggested that “what is measured improves” and KPIs are of-
ten appropriate for PM as a means to assess performance. Al-
l projects should have an approved plan authorizing points at
which the business case is reviewed. Decisions therefrom should
be formalized to provide legitimacy of governance actions (Of-
fice of Government Commerce 2009). The project board should
monitor how work is assigned and undertaken; deal with is-
sues; report progress; and take corrective actions to ensure that
project development remains within tolerances. Therefore, effec-
tive governance should develop compliance “norms” and assess
these through a continuous inspection process.
5.2 Belief System
PG promotes both explicit and implicit facets of an organiza-
tion’s mission. The explicit aspect refers to structures, process-
es, policies, regulations, and so on; while the implicit aspect
concerns governors’ influence via people’s thinking (value, creed,
culture, habit, etc.). This grouping supports Müller and Lecoeu-
vre (2014)’s statement on which GoP should be self-responsible,
self-organizing. This component consists of five variables and ac-
counts for 15.76% of total loadings. Belief system variables are:
Belief 2: “In the process of PM, the company regards the behav-
ioral norms of correct fundamental values” (Sig.=0.71), Belief
5: “After top management has defined the project, it can only
be modified with feedback” (0.70), Belief 1: “Decision-making of
project selection is based on clearly defined strategic goals and
creeds” (0.63), and Belief 3: “Company demands project mem-
bers behave in line with company ‘norms” ’ had a lower loading
(0.55).
The duties of CG not only guide activities through norm reg-
ulation, but also via implicit constraints (culture and industry
customs); so a belief system aids organizational project align-
ment. However, tolerance is necessary whereby decisions made
by senior managers may change. The project board is responsi-
ble for overall direction of a project within corporate constraints,
but may not be involved on a day-to-day basis. Project in Con-
trol Environment (PRINCE2TM) recommends that direction
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and management be separated (Office of Government Commerce
2009). For instance, because once a project enters its execution
stage, a governance board has less “first-hand” knowledge than
that of the project manager(s).
PG as a subject is largely divorced from company leadership
and management. It is not just about board composition, but
also about the board’s policies and working style as influenced
by the parent organization. Each governance member should en-
sure managers act within value guidance (including ethics). The
collapse of Enron is an example of where a belief system failed.
Enron’s governance malfunctioned due to neglect of company
ethical issues (Huse 2003).
5.3 Incentive Mechanism
The third principal factor is ‘incentive mechanisms’ which is re-
sponsible for 15% of total variance. The principal factor includes
variables Incentive 1: “Company has incentives to encourage
project members to strictly follow basic values as their beliefs”
(Sig.= 0.81), Incentive 3: “There are certain incentive schemes
for relevant project personnel to comply with rules” (0.74), In-
centive 2: “Company has internal sanctions for when PM be-
havior contradicts its values” (0.63), and Incentive 4: “Company
determines rewards and sanctions for project members to reflect
levels of project achievement” (0.63).
PG can be explained through principal-agent theory, whereby
the project manager and team members are the assumed agent.
In general, the agent’s compliance with the principal’s directives
can be achieved using incentive-compatible contracts (Hechter
2008). Because of their seniority and associated demands on
their time, project owners or executive members might not in-
volve themselves meaningfully at project level: consistent with
principal-agent theory, they may delegate accountability for ben-
efit realization to others. The establishment of such agency ar-
rangements shifts project decision-making to the implementers,
but delegation of this nature forces a degree of decentralization
on the parent organization (Zwikael and Smyrk 2015).
The first variable relates to an organizational incentive align-
ment device to address the agency issue and provide for project
managers to have honor, monetary reward, promotion, or even
ownership. Such incentives are witnessed in social governance
to establish moral exemplars. The governance body must en-
sure that parent organization values are accommodated by the
project. Where this does not happen, the parent organization
may have to move to protect its own values through drastic
action; a consequence of which means the project might be re-
defined or the project manager reprimanded. The statistical
results indicate that there is a diversified opinion about PG, as
supported by Williams et al. (2010).
5.4 Risk Governance
Risk governance takes account of the complex web of actors,
rules, conventions, processes, and mechanisms concerned with
how relevant risk information is collected, analyzed, and com-
municated, it is therefore, wide-ranging (Hermans et al. 2012).
The three variables under this factor are Risk 1: “Company en-
courages different levels of staff to highlight any uncertainty re-
lating to the project” (Sig.= 0.78), Risk 2: “Company encour-
ages different levels of staff to supplement added value factors
to the project” (0.76), and Risk 3: “Company has stipulated the
collective participation rules of decision activity” (0.70).
Uncertainty and unforeseen risk will always emerge since a
project is dynamic. Many organizations have developed risk
management strategies of which the first task is to identify risks,
including source, probability, impact, detection and possible mit-
igation methods. Risk governance also provides opportunity;
incentive systems can encourage project members to identify
value-adding factors through comparison of benefits versus costs,
and opportunities versus risks. However, project value-adding
attributes are not always fully recognized; or may be “misunder-
stood”. Following project commencement, more detailed project
information will be exposed, thereby offering increased opportu-
nities to explore value creation (Winter and Szczepanek 2008).
Collective decision-making is preferred to balance risk and op-
portunity, implying that the project owner and senior managers
welcome collective decisions because these are superior to in-
dividual decisions. Collective decision-making also encourages
additional cooperative activities such as brainstorming.
6 CONCLUSION
Much literature has focused on the concepts, structures and
models of project governance but the aspect of how PG in-
terfaces with project level governance (and thereby corporate
governance) lacks research and hence grounded theory. This
study developed an operational framework for PG to address
this. Measures were summarized from interview with industrial
professionals and further empirical study involved face-to-face
questionnaire surveys. Exploratory factor analysis of resulting
data enabled an ontology of PG “direct and control” measures at
the operational level comprising a model of four subsystems viz.
i) normative management control; ii) belief control; iii) incentive
mechanism; and iv) risk governance.
The model embraces much theory regarding the concept and
connotations of governance. For instance, by: providing a frame-
work for decision-making and managerial action; achieving clear
distinction between ownership and control of tasks; setting the
boundaries for management action; defining the goals of an or-
ganization and the means by which they should be attained and
the desired managerial processes to control areas of responsibil-
ity.
The findings are of utility to both practitioners and academics
in three ways. That is, by:
1. Describing a model of PG that utilizes a practical frame-
work linking CG and PM.
2. Emphasizing how control plays a superlative role - along
with direction - to achieve desired project outcomes.
These key elements of PG control relate to generic projects
and most of them harmonize with practical guidelines
(such as within PMBoKTM and PRINCE2TM).
3. Employing exploratory factor analysis to yield a four sub-
dimension model representing PG control. This may be
described in simple form as a “belief-norm-risk-incentive”
model - symbolizing an expansion of the existing “control-
trust-risk” model within extant literature.
The above framework will be helpful for project-oriented orga-
nizations to develop effective PG regimes in striving for effective
project performance. The research also advances theory to the
“void” that has existed between CG and PM - its theoretical im-
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plications relate to “bottom-level” governance; in contrast to the
“middle-level” that has formerly been expounded by scholars.
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